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Abstract: This paper exploits a sudden income tax rate increase in a large Italian region to examine 
whether this induced taxpayers to change their tax-related behavior. By using a spatial regression 
discontinuity design and a detailed dataset at the municipality level, we find a sizable and persistent 
decrease in declared income only for the self-employed and entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction 
When national and local governments raise income tax rates, they expect to achieve higher revenues 
which may in turn allow them to balance their public deficits. However, an income tax rate increase 
might push some categories of taxpayers to declare less income. Indeed, while pensioners and 
employees can hardly change their tax-related behavior, the self-employed and entrepreneurs could 
reduce their tax liabilities by deciding to work less hours or by evading (more) taxes. There is a strong 
evidence that self-employed income goes vastly unreported (see, among others, Pissarides and Weber 
1999 and Artavanis et al. 2016 who find a tax evasion rate of over 40% for Britain and Greece, 
respectively) and an increase in tax liabilities could further incentivize such an illicit behavior (see 
Heim, 2010). We contribute to the existing literature by investigating how the self-employed and 
entrepreneurs react to an income tax rate increase. To do so, we exploit a sudden increase in the 
income tax rate in one of the largest Italian regions by adopting a spatial regression discontinuity 
design (spatial RDD) and a rich dataset at the municipality level. 
 
2. Policy 
The Italian central government imposes a progressive income tax, IRPEF (Imposta sul reddito delle 
persone fisiche), which applies to the majority of incomes. It is a “personal” tax, as its amount depends 
on some specific features of the taxpayer, such as his/her occupation and household composition 
(Marino and Zizza, 2012). In 2015, the personal income tax rates were as reported in Table 1. In that 
year, in Italy almost 41 million taxpayers earned incomes subject to IRPEF for an overall declared 
amount of 833 billion euros. 
Table 1 – The Italian personal income tax rates in 2015 
Threshold Rate (%) 
Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
23 
27 
38 
41 
43 
Source: Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance 
On top of the personal income tax, there are also a municipal1 and a regional surcharge. The income 
tax surcharge for regional administrations was introduced in 1998, consisting of a mandatory flat rate 
of 0.9% and an additional discretionary rate of up to 0.5%. Since 2010, the phasing in of fiscal 
federalism has been accompanied by repeated increases in the discretionary element of the regional 
income tax surcharge. In addition, an unusual feature of Italy’s territorial financing arrangements is 
the central government’s ability to require regions to raise the surcharge rates to meet deficits in 
health expenditure (Poole, 2017). In 2015 this led Lazio, one of the richest and most populated Italian 
regions, to raise by one percentage point the regional surcharge on the income tax rate for incomes 
above €35,0002 (from 2.33% to 3.33%). For instance, this meant that a taxpayer with €100,000 of 
taxable income was liable to pay 650€ more than the previous year. At the same time, the six regions 
neighboring with Lazio did not experience relevant changes in the regional surcharge (see Table A1 
in the Appendix).3 This allows us to exploit such geographic discontinuity to estimate the impact on 
taxpayers’ behavior of a sudden increase in the personal income tax rate. 
 
3. Method and data 
Our estimation strategy is based on the spatial RDD first proposed by Holmes (1998). This 
identification strategy is appealing because it controls for confounding unobservables that evolve 
smoothly over space. Locations separated by a regional border share the same geography, access to 
                                                 
1 The municipal income tax rate ranges from 0% to 0.9%. 
2 In December 2014 Lazio regional government approved a lower threshold (€15,000) to the 1 percentage point increase; 
however, in July 2015 the threshold was raised to €35,000. Therefore, the surcharge between €15,000 and 35,000 stayed 
at 2.33%. 
3 The neighboring regions are Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise and Campania. In 2015, only Abruzzo slightly 
raised the regional surcharge for incomes below €28,000 (from 1.54% to 1.73%).   
transportation, and access to specialized labor and supplies; the key feature that sets these locations 
apart is indeed the difference in regional income tax surcharge on the two sides of the border. This 
analysis retrieves the local average treatment effect (LATE) 𝛽 of a percentage point increase in 
personal income tax on different types of taxpayers. To do so, we run the following equation:  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟) + 𝛽𝐷𝑟 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑏
′ 𝛾 + 𝜙𝑏 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑏 
where ∆𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑏 is the log change in the outcome variable between 2014 and 2015 of the i
th municipality 
in region r along segment b of the treatment boundary, 𝐷𝑟 is the binary indicator variable for treatment 
which is unity in case of Lazio and zero else, 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑏
′  are pre-treatment covariates, 𝜙𝑏 is a set of boundary 
segment fixed effects,4 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑏 is the error term and 𝑓(𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟) is the RDD polynomial. 
In the specification of  𝑓(∙) we use the two-dimensional RDD in latitude-longitude space proposed 
by Dell (2010). We employ a 2nd order polynomial in latitude and longitude which allows comparing 
observations which are very close to each other and absorbs all smooth variation in the outcome. 
Our main source of data comes from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finances (MEF) archive 
which makes available yearly data on the declared income by residents’ taxpayers at the municipality 
level. As the treatment is at the taxpayer level, it would have been ideal to gain access to individual 
level data; however, MEF limits disclosure of data collected for tax purposes and it releases only data 
aggregated at the municipality level. Although municipality level data are a second-best alternative, 
municipalities represent the lowest administrative units in Italy, with 378 treated municipalities in 
Lazio and 1,598 control municipalities in its six neighboring regions. Our dataset reports the overall 
declared income and the number of taxpayers split by six categories of income: i) employment, ii) 
retirement, iii) lands and buildings; iv) equity, v) self-employment, and vi) entrepreneurship. The 
availability of such disaggregated data allows us to isolate the self-employment and entrepreneurial 
incomes and test how taxpayers react to a personal income tax increase. In addition, we have collected 
data from the Italian National Statistical Institute on population, area, workplace employment and 
pre-treatment growth rate in workplace employment. These variables, together with the per capita 
income and proportion of self-employment and entrepreneurial incomes derived from the MEF 
archive, are used as pre-treatment variables. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Each boundary segment dummy denotes which segment of the Lazio boundary is the closest to the municipalities’ 
centroids. 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the spatial RDD estimated impact of the income tax rate increase on the overall 
declared income (Panel A), the self-employment and entrepreneurial declared incomes (Panel B), and 
the retirement, employment, lands and buildings and equity declared incomes (Panel C) for the 
specifications without (1) and with (2) pre-treatment covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑏
′ . 
Table 2 – Spatial RDD estimates 
 Dependent variable   (1) (2) 
Panel A - Growth rate in overall 
declared income  
Coefficient 0.02 0.00 
Standard Error (0.33) (0.34) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,976 1,976 
Panel B - Growth rate in self-
employment and entrepreneurial 
declared incomes 
Coefficient -4.44*** -4.67*** 
Standard Error (1.40) (1.50) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
Panel C - Growth rate in 
retirement, employment, lands 
and buildings and equity 
declared incomes 
Coefficient 0.28 0.30 
Standard Error (0.35) (0.35) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,976 1,976 
Notes: All specifications include border-segment fixed effects. Conley (1999) 
standard errors that correct for spatial dependence of unknown form in parentheses. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The estimates in Panel A show that, overall, there is no decrease in declared income after the surge 
in income tax rate. However, column (1) of Panel B shows that, when we isolate self-employment 
and entrepreneurial incomes, there is a sizable and highly statistically significant decrease in declared 
income of -4.44%. When we add the pre-treatment covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑏
′  (column (2)) the negative impact 
gets even larger, i.e. -4.67%. We check the robustness of this finding in a number of ways and 
summarize the results of interest in Table 3. The first robustness test shows that the finding is robust 
to a falsification test, i.e. when we re-estimate our model assigning fake treatment dates to one year 
before actual treatment, we obtain statistically insignificant effects (Panel A). Our main finding also 
holds when we add the municipal IRPEF surcharge among control variables (Panels B) and when we 
drop the municipalities which increased or decreased the municipal surcharge between 2014 and 2015 
(Panel C). Lastly, to the use of different polynomials of the Spatial RDD does not substantially affect 
the extent of the estimates (Panels D and E).  
Table 3 – Robustness checks 
 Robustness check   (1) (2) 
Panel A – Using as dependent 
variable the growth rate in the 
self-employment and 
entrepreneurial declared 
incomes in the year before the 
policy change  
Coefficient -1.16 -1.40 
Standard Error (1.32) (1.25) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,953 1,953 
Panel B – Addition of the pre-
treatment municipal surcharge 
as control variable 
Coefficient -4.51*** -4.77*** 
Standard Error (1.42) (1.52) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
Panel C – Removal of 
municipalities which increased 
or decreased the municipal 
surcharge between 2014 and 
2015 
Coefficient -3.27** -3.46** 
Standard Error (1.28) (1.35) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,706 1, 706 
Panel D – Use of 1st order RDD 
polynomial 
Coefficient -4.13*** -4.45*** 
Standard Error (1.33) (1.44) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
Panel E – Use of 3rd order RDD 
polynomial 
Coefficient -5.41*** -5.19*** 
Standard Error (1.76) (1.85) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
Notes: See notes of Table 2. 
We then investigate whether such a decrease is due to a reduction in the number of individuals 
declaring incomes from self-employment and entrepreneurial activities or it is due to individuals 
declaring lower amounts per capita. As shown in Panels A and B of Table 4, both phenomena are at 
work. Besides, as there were no changes in the regional surcharge in the seven regions under analysis 
between 2015 and 2016, we further investigate whether the decrease in self-employment and 
entrepreneurial incomes was short-lived or not. Panel C of Table 4 reports a drop of -7.59% in 
declared income in 2016 with respect to 2014, which shows that the self-employed and entrepreneurs 
declared even less income two years after the surge in income tax rate. 
 
 
Table 4 – Additional spatial RDD estimates 
 Dependent variable   (1) (2) 
Panel A - Growth rate in the 
number of taxpayers declaring 
income from self-employment 
and entrepreneurial activities 
Coefficient -2.18** -2.14** 
Standard Error (0.97) (1.01) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
Panel B - Growth rate in self-
employment and entrepreneurial 
average declared incomes 
Coefficient -2.26** -2.53** 
Standard Error (1.05) (1.08) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,952 1,952 
Panel C - Growth rate in self-
employment and entrepreneurial 
declared incomes between 2014 
and 2016 
Coefficient -7.45*** -7.59*** 
Standard Error (2.37) (2.49) 
   
Control variables No Yes 
Observations 1,924 1,924 
Notes: See notes of Table 2. 
It is theoretically possible that the sudden increase in the income tax rate might have led self-
employed and entrepreneurs to work less hours. Although there are no disaggregated data available 
to investigate such alternative channel, the use of survey data suggests that this did not happen. 
Indeed, Table 4 reports a descriptive analysis of survey data at the regional level showing no evidence 
that in Lazio there was a change in the working behavior of entrepreneurs and self-employed with 
respect to the number of hours worked between 2014 and 2015. In addition, we find a similar result 
in Table 6 by analyzing the number of registered merchants and artisans reported by the Italian Social 
Security Institute (INPS) observatory of independent workers. This means that it is unlikely that the 
increase in the regional surcharge pushed the self-employed and entrepreneurs to work less; therefore, 
the most likely explanation of the decrease in declared income by entrepreneurs and self-employed 
is an exacerbation of their tax evasion behavior. 
Table 5 – Average number of hours worked per week for the self-employed and entrepreneurs 
 Self-employed  Entrepreneurs 
Region 2014 2015  2014 2015 
Tuscany 44.04 43.54  46.53 46.65 
Umbria 43.16 43.36  50.95 46.27 
Marche 42.28 42.73  47.45 46.49 
Lazio 42.13 42.26  48.47 50.10 
Abruzzo 42.88 42.15  46.75 54.67 
Molise 43.35 45.04  48.07 52.09 
Campania 41.86 41.26  51.35 48.98 
Notes: Data are derived from the Italian Labor Force Survey 
Table 6 – Number of registered independent workers 
 Merchants  Artisans 
Region 2014 2015  2014 2015 
Tuscany 170,351 169,163  153,156 150,160 
Umbria 35,898 35,772  31,205 30,625 
Marche 63,861 62,971  69,598 68,010 
Lazio 209,347 211,017  120,569 118,509 
Abruzzo 50,827 50,786  40,853 39,694 
Molise 10,939 10,843  8,809 8,566 
Campania 215,379 218,249  82,174 80,520 
Notes: Data are derived from the INPS observatory of independent workers 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
We analyze the effect of a one percentage point increase in income tax rate on the behavior of different 
categories of taxpayers. Using a spatial RDD, we find that a one percentage point increase in the 
income tax rate engendered a sizable and persistent decrease in self-employment and entrepreneurial 
incomes, likely due to an increase in their tax evasion rate. From the regional government point of 
view, raising the income tax surcharge led to the “expected” increase in tax revenues mainly because 
in 2015 self-employment and entrepreneurial incomes made up only 8.2% of the overall declared 
income. On the other hand, from the taxpayers’ point of view, such an increase meant that the 
additional tax burden fell almost entirely on the employees and the pensioners’ shoulders, who were 
already the taxpayers’ categories liable to most taxes. 
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Appendix 
 
 
2014 2015 
Region Thresholds Surcharge (%) Thresholds Surcharge (%) 
Lazio Up to €15,000 
Above €15,000 
1.73 
2.33 
Up to €15,000 
Up to €35,000 
Above €35,000* 
1.73 
2.33 
3.33 
Abruzzo Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Above €28,000 
1.54 
1.66 
1.73 
Unique 1.73 
Campania Unique 2.03 Unique 2.03 
Marche Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
1.23 
1.53 
1.70 
1.72 
1.73 
Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
1.23 
1.53 
1.70 
1.72 
1.73 
Molise Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
2.03 
2.23 
2.43 
2.53 
2.63 
Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
2.03 
2.23 
2.43 
2.53 
2.63 
Tuscany Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
1.42 
1.43 
1.68 
1.72 
1.73 
Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
1.42 
1.43 
1.68 
1.72 
1.73 
Umbria Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
1.23 
1.63 
1.68 
1.73 
1.83 
Up to €15,000 
Up to €28,000 
Up to €55,000 
Up to €75,000 
Above €75,000 
1.23 
1.63 
1.68 
1.73 
1.83 
Notes: * In December 2014 Lazio regional government approved a lower threshold (€15,000) to the 1 
percentage point increase; however, in July 2015 the threshold was raised to €35,000. Therefore, the 
surcharge between €15,000 and 35,000 stayed at 2.33%. 
